




Charitable Giving, Emotions, and the Default Effect




Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Noussair, C., & Habetinova, L. (2015). Charitable Giving, Emotions, and the Default Effect. (CentER Discussion
Paper; Vol. 2015-043). CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






















CHARITABLE GIVING, EMOTIONS, 


























Charitable Giving, Emotions, and the Default Effect




We report an experiment to study the effect of defaults on charitable giving. In
three different treatments, participants face varying default levels of donation. In
three other treatments that are paired with the first three, they receive the same
defaults, but are informed that defaults are thought to have an effect on their dona-
tion decisions. The emotional state of all individuals is monitored throughout the
sessions using Facereading software, and some participants are required to report
their emotional state after the donation decision. We find that the default level
has no effect on donations, and informing individuals of the possible impact of de-
faults also has no effect. The decision to donate is independent of prior emotional
state, unless specific subgroups of participants are considered. Donors experience
a negative change in the valence of their emotional state subsequent to donating,
when valence is measured with Facereading software. This contrasts with the self-
report data, in which donating correlates with a more positive reported subsequent
emotional state.
JEL Classification: C91
Keywords: charitable giving, emotion, default, facereading
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1 Introduction
Charitable giving, in the form of money, time, or in kind, constitutes a non-
negligible fraction of the economy in many countries. Nevertheless, there does
appear to be scope to increase donations through the application of behavioral
economics. Experimental methods have been used to test a number of techniques
for increasing donations, including lotteries (Landry et al., 2006), tontines (Lange
et al., 2007), challenge gifts (Andreoni, 2006), and matching gift campaigns (Eckel
and Grossman, 2003; Karlan and List, 2012). The study reported here considers
the potential influence of default donation levels on charitable giving.
By a default, we refer to an action which will be taken unless the subject over-
rides it by actively choosing another option. One rationale for the study of defaults
is that, if individuals are presented with a default donation level that becomes bind-
ing unless they change it, it may serve as a reference point, or anchor (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), from which individuals insufficiently adjust. Moreover, if the
cost of changing a choice outweighs the benefit of lowering a donation, one might
choose to maintain giving at the default level. If these effects are substantial, it
indicates that a charity can intentionally choose default donation levels to increase
donations. Indeed, defaults have been shown to be powerful attractors in a number
of other domains.1
A few previous experimental studies have explored the effect of defaults on
charitable giving, as we do here. Grossman and Eckel (2012) show that making a
50–50 split of an available amount a default level can induce people to donate more.
In a field experiment on the default effect and public good giving, Carlsson et al.
(2011) find that people in a low default condition contribute substantially less to
a public good, a new bridge, than under a baseline treatment. The results from
a high default treatment are inconclusive, however. Altmann and Falk (2009) find
that a relatively high default, in a linear public good game, increases contributions
relative both to a baseline and a low, non-cooperative default.
However, it stands to reason that, once they have enough experience, at least
some potential donors might become aware of default effects and thus may correct
for them when they make their decisions. To examine the implications of such
awareness, we include treatments in which we explain the default effect to partici-
pants. One way to view this procedure is as a form of de-biasing. A large literature
exists on de-biasing methods (see for example Babcock et al. (1997) or Cason and
Plott (2014)). Popular methods for de-biasing are to ask participants to generate
alternative scenarios, or to make decisions in steps (see for example Koriat et al.
(1980), or Kivetz and Simonson (2000)). Another method to help people make
better choices is to provide more information about the decision situation. How-
ever, the evidence on the effectiveness of this is mixed (Elbel et al., 2009; Schwarz
et al., 2007; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008). The presumed effect of explaining de-
1Defaults have been shown to exert effects on the choice of whether or not to donate organs (Johnson
and Goldstein, 2003), as well as on savings decisions (Madrian and Shea, 2001). As many researchers have
argued, defaults can be seen as implicit recommendations or an experimenter’s expectation (McKenzie
et al. (2006)), or as social norms (Carlsson et al. (2011)) which may be costly to violate. Defaults may
anchor participants’ decisions (Dhingra et al. (2012), Dinner et al. (2011)), and switching away from
them might involve cognitive effort (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). People can also suffer from status
quo bias (Kahneman et al., 1991; Korobkin, 1997) and hence be unwilling to override the default. People
can simply procrastinate and keep on postponing a decision, effectively making the default option apply
(as argued in Choi et al. (2003)).
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fault effects would be to reduce their magnitude. It is possible, however, that the
information about defaults may make them even stronger attractors, that is, dis-
closure may well strengthen the default effect. The subjects might perceive the
information as an implicit recommendation and perhaps be more likely to select
the default option.
In our experiment, we monitor the emotional correlates of donation decisions.
It is clear that there may be emotional underpinnings to the decision to donate. As
Small and Verrochi (2009) show, emotionally-charged images can have a profound
influence on donations. They observe that subjects viewing sad pictures donate
more on average to a cause. Emotions are also presumably one of the mechanisms
generating the identifiable victim effect that is known to increase donations Jenni
and Loewenstein (1997); Genevsky et al. (2013). Furthermore, the act of donation
or failure to donate may generate an emotional response on the part of the donor
(Rubaltelli and Agnoli, 2012).
A large body of work has shown that emotions do affect decisions in related
contexts. Positive mood can significantly increase people’s willingness to help others
(for example Isen and Levin (1972)). In turn, giving can make people happier and
these two effects can reinforce each other (Anik et al., 2009). Of particular interest
to us is that relationship between emotional state and the power of defaults. Lerner
et al. (2004) demonstrate that sadness and disgust can eliminate the endowment
effect, otherwise a robust type of default effect (Kahneman et al., 1991). Lin et al.
(2006) obtain similar results. Martinez et al. (2011) find that while regret eliminates
the endowment effect, disappointment reverses it.
To study the relationship between emotions and donation, we gather objec-
tive physiological measures of participants’ emotions, registered with face reading
software, before and after they make their donation decisions. We test whether a
positive emotional state predicts a larger donation. We also consider whether one
or more specific emotions is predictive of donations. We test whether behaving
pro-socially makes people feel more positively afterwards, and which emotions in
particular follow a decision to donate or not to donate.
In our experiment, each subject is given an endowment and is asked to split
it between herself and a charity.2 Our design is in part based on Carpenter et al.
(2008), who study a dictator game, in which the receiver is a charitable organization.
Subjects are given the option to choose their preferred charity to contribute to.
They can either pick one from a menu of prespecified options or indicate a different
charity as a destination for a donation. The most closely related work to ours is
by Grossman and Eckel (2012) whose three treatments are similar to three of the
treatments in our design. Specifically, subjects in the Grossman and Eckel (2012)
study are put in one of three situations: (1) they are allocated the full endowment
of 20 dollars and can donate a part of it to charity, (2) the initial endowment is
split evenly (10 Euros to each party) between the individual and a charity and the
subject may increase or reduce the charity’s share, or (3) the charity is allocated
the full endowment of 20 dollars and the subject can take away some of money for
herself.
In our study, we find no evidence that defaults have any effect on donation levels.
Similarly, informing potential donors of the hypothesized effect of defaults also has
2Engel (2011), in a metastudy of dictator game experiments, reports that dictators give away on
average around 28% of their endowment and the distribution of means in different experimental conditions
is skewed to the right. If the recipient is needy or deserving (such as a charity), donations are higher.
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no effect. We observe that a more positive emotional state correlates with making
greater donations, but this relationship only appears for those who choose their
own charity to donate to and those who make relatively high donations. Higher
donations lead to a more positive self-reported emotional state, but to a less positive
state as registered by our physiological measure. While our experiment was not
designed to detect the reason for such a discrepancy, two possible explanations for
the pattern are (1) that there is reporting bias in the self-reports, perhaps because
individuals feel pressured to indicate that donation makes them feel more positive,
or (2) the physiological measure exclusively captures immediate affective state, but
the self-reports also integrate other sources of subjective well-being. We also find
that women donate more than men. Moreover, we observe that session size is an
important explanatory variable, with donations higher in relatively small sessions.
In the next section we describe our experiment. In section three we report our
results, and in section four we present our conclusions.
2 Experiment Design and Implementation
2.1 Procedures common to all treatments
The experiment was conducted in the CentER laboratory at Tilburg University
in the Netherlands, in groups of sizes of between 1 and 10, in the year 2014. In
total, 270 subjects (114 male) participated. They were recruited using the Tilburg
University online recruitment system. The subjects were bachelor’s and master’s
students majoring in economics, business, and law. In the majority of cases, the
sessions of this experiment were run after other, longer experiments (see Table
2). In those cases, participants were not informed about the second session until
the first one was over. A few sessions (encompassing 24 subjects) were run with
subjects who had not participated in any experiment beforehand. When possible,
all sessions were run in a separate room from the first, in order to emphasize the
independence of the two experiments, and to thereby enhance isolation effects. All
sessions were run by the same (female) experimenter in order to eliminate possible
experimenter effects which, especially in the context of charitable giving, can affect
behavior (Landry et al., 2006). We employed the z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects earned 3.16 euro on average (not including the participation fee)
in this experiment.
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter turned on video cameras on
each computer with the consent of the subjects. Subsequently, all subjects received
written instructions, which were read aloud by the experimenter. While subjects
could ask the experimenter about something that was unclear, no between-subject
communication was allowed throughout the experiment. Subjects were paid by
bank transfer after the session.
In all conditions, participants were presented with the screen illustrated in fig-
ure 1, and asked to split 5 euro (in 25-cent increments) between themselves and a
charitable organization. They could either contribute to KNGF Geleidehonden, a
Dutch charity which trains dogs for visually-impaired people, chosen by the exper-
imenter, or could indicate any other charity of their choice to contribute to. All
donations were sent to to the respective charities after all experimental sessions
were finished. Participants could request a receipt proving that the money was
indeed sent to charity; though no subject did so.
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Our experimental design allows, but does not require, individuals to specify a
charity of their choice as the destination for their donation. We consider whether
it correlates with donation level, though we cannot isolate the effect the choice of
charity on donations from that of self-selection. That is, people who choose their
preferred charity may be better informed about charities and be more frequent or
larger donors.3
Figure 1: Decision screen
2.2 Treatments and treatment-specific procedures
There were eight conditions (see Table 1). There were three default levels, low,
medium, and high. A low default corresponded to a default donation equal to zero,
medium default to a donation of 2.50 and high default to a donation of 5. A default
level of donation was implemented by pre-selecting a button in the display on sub-
jects’ computer screens, as in Figure 1. Subjects were free to change the selection,
but if they took no action, the default level of donation was implemented. Each
default level was implemented under two information levels, informed, and not in-
formed, about the default effect. In the informed conditions participants received
the following information:
3The characteristics of the charity in question matter, and must be taken into account when consid-
ering how to increase donations. A charity seen as effective and providing quality services is likely to
attract greater donations (Sargeant et al., 2004). Personal involvement or experience can induce people
to choose one charity over another (Bennett, 2003). Empathy with a particular cause leads to greater
donations (Basil et al., 2008; Small and Simonsohn, 2008).
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Please note that one of the options may be randomly pre-selected for you.
A number of published studies have shown that many people will be influenced by
this selection: i.e. they will donate more if the pre-selected choice offers a high
donation, and they will donate less if the pre-selected choice offers a low donation.
A Baseline treatment, in which there was no default and no information about
defaults, was also included. In addition, we implemented another treatment, called
BaselineSR (Baseline + Self-Report), which was identical to the Baseline treatment,
but with one added feature. The subjects were asked to report how they felt
immediately after the donation decision. They were not informed that they would
be asked about their emotions until after they made the donation decision. On
a scale from 0 to 10, subjects had to state how happy, sad, angry, scared, and
disgusted they felt. In total 53 subjects in 8 sessions participated in this treatment.
Table 1 lists the treatments, the number of subjects who participated in each
treatment, and the number of sessions conducted. Low default corresponded to no
donation, medium to a donation of 2.50 euro and high to a donation of 5 euro.
Table 1: The Eight Treatments









Table 2: Preceding Experiments
Experiment Number of subjects Description
None 24 Did not participate in prior experiments
Exp.yl1 37 Market experiment
Exp.yl2 11 Market experiment
Exp.mrkt1 33 Questionnaire, involved eating
Exp.mrkt2 13 Questionnaire
Exp.eli 7 Green technology transition experiment
Exp.car 6 Art experiment
Exp.gonz1 72 Asset-pricing (macroeconomics) experiment
Exp.gonz2 5 Tulip market experiment
Exp.ays 9 Reference points experiment
2.3 Facereader software
All participants were videotaped, with their consent, during the entire session. The
videotapes were analyzed later using Noldus Facereader 5. Facereader uses the
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Active Template Method (ATM) to locate the position of a face in an image; and,
should this method fail to locate a face, a second algorithm (Viola Jones cascaded
classifier algorithm) takes over. Then, the Active Appearance Model (AAM) lo-
cates 530 key points on the face, using a database of several thousand annotated
images. It classifies the face’s expression by how much it reflects the emotions of
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise, as well as neutrality. The
facial expressions that correspond to the six basic emotions appear to be universal
and innate, in that they are common across all cultures and different primates (Ek-
man and Friesen, 1986; Ekman, 2007), as well as between blind and sighted humans
(Ekman, 2007; Matsumoto and Willingham, 2009).
Facereader has been shown to reliably identify the emotion an individual intends
to show (Bijlstra and Dotsch, 2011). It correlates highly with self-reported emotions
(Den Uyl and Van Kuilenburg, 2005). Furthermore, it classifies human expressions
as well as human observers do (Kuderna-Iulian and Valeriu, 2009; Terzis et al.,
2010; Lewinski et al., 2014). In particular, it correctly identifies happiness as the
emotion an actor intends to express, with an accuracy rate of 97 percent Den Uyl
and Van Kuilenburg (2005). Facereader has been used in experimental economics
to study risk aversion (Nguyen and Noussair, 2014), asset markets (Breaban and
Noussair, 2013), and rejection decisions in ultimatum games (Van Leeuwen et al.,
2014).
Facereading has a number of attractive features as a tool to measure emotions.
It provides objective physiological correlates of subjects’ emotional state (in con-
trast to self-reports where subjects may have incentives to misreport their true
feelings). It yields a quantitative measure for the intensity of emotions. It operates
unobtrusively, meaning that the data collection would likely not be noticed by the
subjects had they not been informed about it. Finally, it operates in nearly real
time, with current emotional state registered 30 times per second.
Facereader reports values for the six emotions plus neutrality on a scale between
zero to one. From these, we derive a measure of valence at time t that equals:
valencet = happinesst − 0.25 ∗ (angert + sadnesst + feart + disgustt) (1)
This is a measure of net positivity of emotional state, in that it equals the difference
between the only positive basic emotion, happiness, and the average of the four
negative emotions: anger, sadness, fear, and disgust). Valence ranges from -1 to
+1.
3 Hypotheses
The three hypotheses that we evaluate originate in previous research. The first
hypothesis is that the default pull on donations would appear in our setting. As
we described earlier, there have been experiments showing that under low defaults,
people donate less (Carlsson et al., 2011), and that under high defaults people do-
nate more (Altmann and Falk, 2009). Support or refutation of this hypothesis is
a statement about the robustness of these default effects. If a similar pattern is
observed here, it would support the view that the result is robust. On the other
hand, it is by no means evident that a default effect would be robust. Indeed,
there is reason to believe that the default effect may be fragile. While the default
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level can serve as an anchor or as a reference point, its ability to do so may be
very sensitive to the particular individuals who are measured, to the availability
of attention to direct to the task, or to subtle differences in context or framing.
Because a default induces no direct incentives to make a particular donation other
than a trivially lower cost of effort in maintaining the donation at the default level
rather than changing it, other considerations can readily override it. Nevertheless,
because the few previous studies conducted in related setting have reported an ef-
fect of defaults, we maintain, a priori, the hypothesis that default donation levels
shift decisions closer to the default level.
H1: People facing a lower default contribute less to charity.
As indicated earlier, explaining to an individual that a default may affect her
decisions could alter her behavior. It may cause her to try compensate for the effect.
That is, she may adjust her donation consciously to attempt to offset the impact
of the default. If a substantial fraction of individuals respond in this manner, the
effect of defaults on donations will be reduced. This is in line with previous research
(Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008). However, it is also possible that the information will
render the default level an even stronger anchor or reference point. Thus, our hy-
pothesis about the difference between conditions with and without information is
that there is no effect and thus the tests we conduct are two-sided. We hypothesize
that:
H2: Informing participants about the default effect does not affect donations.
Our third hypothesis has two parts and concerns the relationship between emo-
tional state and donation level. The first part is that prior emotional state correlates
with subsequent donations, with more positive emotions accompanying higher lev-
els of giving. A number of previous studies have reported that positive emotional
state, as indicated in self-reports, correlates positively with subsequent charitable
giving (Isen and Levin, 1972; Anik et al., 2009). This leads us to hypothesize that
the same relationship would exist when emotional state is measured with Faceread-
ing software. The second pattern is a correlation between the amount donated
and subsequent emotional state, with greater donations leading to more positive
emotions. Anik et al. (2009) find that individuals report greater satisfaction after
making a donation. However, DellaVigna et al. (2012) argue that if giving takes
place out of social pressure, which may be present in our experiment, it can lower the
utility of the donor. Because of these potentially offsetting effects, we hypothesize
that making a donation has no overall relationship with subsequent emotional state.
H3a: Individuals with more positive emotional valence donate more.




This section is organized as follows. We first briefly describe the overall patterns
in the data, and then evaluate our two hypotheses about the relationship between
defaults, information, and donation levels. We then turn our attention to the
relationship between emotions and giving. Lastly, in section 4.2, we report a number
of observations from an exploratory analysis of the data.
4.1 Description of the data and tests of hypotheses
Four prominent patterns appear in the overall donation data. First, out of total of
270 subjects, approximately a fifth (57) donated nothing; the share of people donat-
ing zero ranged between 16.1% (medium + info, high+ info) and 25.8% (baseline)
per treatment. Second, almost a ninth (31) of the subjects donated everything;
their share per treatment ranged between 6.4% (low + info, medium + info) and
19.3% (high + info). Third, an eighth (33) of subjects offered a fair 50:50 split;
the lowest share of these subjects was in baseline (6.4%), and the highest in high
default condition (19.3%). And fourth, 15% (40) of our subjects donated one euro,
corresponding to 20% of their endowment. Fifty-four subjects donated between 1
and 1.5, a typical average range of giving in dictator games (Engel, 2011). Their
share ranged between 9.7% (medium) and 19.3% (baseline, medium + info) of sub-
jects.
Our first hypothesis was that the default level of donation would affect the de-
cisions of participants. In contrast, however, the first result that we report is that
the presence of the value of a default has no significant effect on giving.
Result 1: Defaults do not affect donations.
Support for Result 1 Figure 1 shows the average donation by treatment. The
impression conveyed by the figure is that differences among treatments are rela-
tively small. Table 3 reports the results of Wilcoxon rank sum tests of treatment
differences. None of the treatments is statistically significantly different from any
other at p=0.05.4
The lack of a default effect reported in result 1 suggests, but does not neces-
sarily imply, that informing individuals that defaults may exert an effect on their
decisions would have no impact. Indeed, as reported in result 2, we find that the
information does not affect donation levels.
Result 2: Informing individuals about the anticipated effect of defaults
has no effect on donations
Support for result 2: We make pairwise comparisons between the Low and
Low-Info, Medium and Medium-Info, and High and High-Info treatments, using
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The result are reported in the bottom portion of table
4We also tested whether subjects in our two baseline conditions donate the same amount on average.
The difference between the conditions is not significant, with a rank sum test yielding a p-value of 0.694.
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Figure 2: Average donation by treatment
3. None of the differences are significant at conventional levels.
Results 1 and 2 indicate an absence of support for Hypotheses 1, but do sup-
port Hypothesis 2. However, though defaults do not affect decisions, other factors
may well do so. Results 3 and 4 consider the emotional correlates of donations.
Result 3 reports that positive valence, as well as the specific emotion of happiness,
as registered with Facereading software, is uncorrelated with greater subsequent
donations, unless certain specific subgroups are considered.
Result 3: Emotional valence, as well as individual emotions, are not sig-
nificantly correlated with subsequent donations for the overall sample.
However, valence and happiness are positively correlated with donations
for those who are high donors and those who choose their own charity.
Support for Result 3: Figure 3 illustrates the donation level for each quartile of
happiness, sadness, and overall valence. Individuals in the least happy quartile do-
nate an average of 1.65 Euro while the happiest quartile donate 2.01 Euro. Valence
exhibits a similar pattern with those in the highest quartile donating roughly 20
percent more than the lowest. Sadness does not exhibit a consistent relationship
with donation. The same is the case for fear, anger, and disgust, which are not
illustrated.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, between both happiness and valence
prior to the decision and donation level are positive, at ρ = 0.0907 and 0.1018,
respectively. However, these correlations are not significant at conventional levels,
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Table 3: Wilcoxon Ranksum Test: Do Defaults or Information about Them Affect
Donations?
Null hypothesis p-value
Baseline = Low 0.618
Baseline = Medium 0.793
Baseline = High 0.654
Baseline = Low + Info 0.820
Baseline = Medium + Info 0.712
Baseline = High + Info 0.509
Low = Medium 0.338
Medium = High 0.910
Low = High 0.206
Low + Info = Medium + Info 0.820
Medium + Info = High + Info 0.260
Low + Info = High + Info 0.387
Low= Low + Info 0.655
Medium = Medium + Info 0.461
High = High + Info 0.887
yielding p-values of 0.146 and 0.103. The corresponding p-values of the other emo-
tions are all greater than .45. Wilcoxon ranksum tests confirm that even the largest
difference, between the first and the last quartile of happiness, is not statistically
significant (p-value of 0.352). The same holds for valence (p-value of 0.354).
However, there are two important exceptions to this pattern. The first is that
those who donated very high amounts, at least 3/4 of the 5 Euro endowment, are
significantly happier and have more positive valence than the rest of the sample (p
= .0321). This is shown in table 4. The second is that those individuals who chose
their charity (seven percent of all subjects) do exhibit a positive correlation of 0.69
(p-value 0.003) between prior happiness and donation level. While relatively small
in number, this is an important subgroup, because they are more likely than other
participants to be active donors. For this subgroup, prior sadness is also negatively
correlated with donation (ρ = -0.577, p = 0.019), and for them, valence exhibits a
significant correlation as well (ρ = 0.7219, p = 0.0016).
We now consider whether donations affect the emotional state of the donor, and
the pattern we observe is described in result 4.
Result 4: Higher donations are positively correlated with subsequent
self-reported emotional valence. However, higher donations are also
correlated with subsequent decreases in our physiological measure of
valence, so that after the giving decision, donors and non-donors are in
a similar emotional state.
Support for Result 4: The upper panel of Figure 4 shows the relationship be-
tween donations and subsequent self-reported emotional state. Self-reported emo-
tions correlate positively with prior donation behavior. Donations and happiness
have a correlation of 0.2282 (p = 0.100). Donation correlates with valence at 0.3365
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Figure 3: Emotions prior to decision (Facereader)
(p = 0.014), and with sadness of -0.4554 (p = 0.001), When comparing the lowest
and highest quartiles of self-reported emotions, the average donation is borderline
significantly different for happiness (p-value 0.074), while significantly different for
sadness (p-value 0.007) and valence (p-value 0.021).
The Facereader data are illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 4. The figure
suggests an absence of a relationship between the amount of donation and emotional
state. Table 4 shows the magnitude of valence and the individual emotions both
before and after the decision to donate, for different ranges of donations.
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is used to consider whether valence differs be-
fore and after making the donation decision. The results are reported in Table 5.
Valence is lower after than prior to the decision (p-value of 0.000). However, this
result only holds for the pooled data from donors and non-donors, and for instances
in which the donation is positive. When the subject’s donation equals zero, the val-
ues for the two valences are statistically indistinguishable (p-value of 0.411). High
donors, those who give more than 3/4 of their endowment, experience particularly
large decreases in valence after their decision (p = .0321), bringing them to similar
levels of valence and happiness as others who donated less.
4.2 Other correlates of giving
Though the treatments do not correlate with decisions, we do find that a number
of other factors do. The first of these is the number of subjects in a session.
Observation 1: The number of subjects in a session correlates negatively
with average donation
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Table 4: Summary statistics: Emotions given donations
0 >0 0.25 - 1.75 2.00 - 3.50 3.75 - 5.00
# observations before 53 205 85 74 46
# observations after 48 152 62 57 33
Valence before 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.22
Valence after 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Happiness before 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.25
Happiness after 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
Sadness before 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06
Sadness after 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Table 5: Signed-Rank Test: Change in Emotions (p-values) given donations
0 >0 0.25 - 1.75 2.00 - 3.50 3.75 - 5.00
# observations 47 152 62 57 33
Valence 0.604 0.000 0.024 0.100 0.000
Happiness 0.117 0.000 0.011 0.186 0.000
Sadness 0.197 0.452 0.304 0.858 0.675
Support for Observation 1: Figure 5 shows that the average donation falls as
the session size increases. On average, 50 percent of endowment is donated in ses-
sions withe 1 or 2 participants, while the average falls to 21 percent in sessions of
9 - 10 individuals.
There are at least two plausible explanations for this effect. First, it may be
the case that subjects perceive greater anonymity in a larger group and interpret
this as a license to behave selfishly. Second, is that if the subjects think that the
experimenter is aiming to raise a fixed amount of money, such as 20 euro, then
subjects in larger groups feel less responsible individually for reaching this target,
reasoning that there are sufficiently many other people who can donate instead.
Another strong correlate of donations is gender. We find that females donate
significantly more than males. This pattern is summarized as Observation 2.
Observation 2: Male subjects donate significantly less than female sub-
jects.
Support for Observation 2: The average donation of males is 1.66, while the
average for females is 2.04. A Wilcoxon ranksum test yields a p-value of 0.0373,
indicating that the difference is significant.
These results contrast, for example, with those of Bolton and Katok (1995),
who find no evidence for gender differences in generosity in the dictator game while
corroborating the results of List and Price (2009), DellaVigna et al. (2013), and
the overall conclusion of Engel (2011), that women give more than men in dictator
games. However, while women give more overall in our experiment, neither gender
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Table 6: Signed-Rank Test: Change in Emotions (p-values) given donations for
self-selected people
0 >0 0.25 - 1.75 2.00 - 3.50 3.75 - 5.00
# observations 0 14 5 7 2
Happiness . 0.0640 0.6858 0.1763 0.1797
Sadness . 0.7299 0.8927 0.8658 0.6547
is affected by the existence or the level of the default.
Observation 3: Both genders are insensitive to defaults.
Support for Observation 3: All p-values for the comparisons reported in Table
3, when conducted for each gender separately, are above 0.05. Thus, the treatment
effects are insignificant for both genders.
Observation 3 contrasts with the study of Roberts and Gettman (2004) who
show that in some situations, women can be more susceptible to priming, as well as
with the study of Terkildsen and Schnell (1997) showing that in other cases, men
are more susceptible to framing. Neither gender in our experiment was affected
by defaults to a greater extent than the other. The next observation concerns
the subset of the sample (7 percent) who chose their own charity. We find that
they donate more than others. This pattern is quite reasonable, since these indi-
viduals are presumably more likely to be regular donors than the rest of the sample.
Observation 4: People who choose their charity to contribute to donate
more than those who do not.
Support for Observation 4: While the average donation of those who do not
choose their charity is 1.80, those who specify a destination for their donation give
an average of 2.50. A Wilcoxon ranksum test rejects the hypothesis that the two
levels are equal (p = 0.0370).5
5 Conclusion
In our study, we do not detect any effect of a default on donation decisions. Those
who were given relatively low, medium, and high default donation levels behave in
a similar manner. We also observe that informing individuals about defaults has
no impact on their decisions. This does not suggest that de-biasing techniques are
not effective; there was no behavioral bias to remove.
While defaults seem to have an effect in some other settings, these appear to have
a tendency to be situations in which the context is relatively complex and unfamiliar
to participants (Choi et al., 2004; Schweitzer, 1995). Our task is very simple and
rather familiar because of its contextualized nature. This may be conducive to
5Nine percent of women and 4 percent of men choose their preferred charity. Among the individuals
who specify a charity, there is no gender difference in donation level. Males donate 2.54, and females
2.4, on average, and a rank-sum test fails to reject equality (p = 0.83).
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Figure 4: Self-reported and Facereader-measured emotions after decision
enabling people to form decisions confidently and to override the defaults. Our
results are consistent with the idea that idiosyncratic individual factors are more
important determinants of donation decisions that the variables we have varied in
15
Figure 5: Average donation by session size
our study.
We have also studied the relationship between emotions and giving. We cor-
roborate, using facereading software to measure emotional state, the finding that
self-reported emotions are more positive for those who donate, though only among
subsamples who are high donors or who indicate the intended destination for their
donation. For the whole sample, however, there was no relationship between emo-
tional valence and giving. Nonetheless, the relationship between emotions and
giving in the subsamples in which we find it is important, since high donors and
those knowledgeable about charities are likely to be those who make donations in
the field.
Self-reports indicate that those who donate are in a more positive emotional
state afterwards. However, our facereading data indicate those who donate expe-
rience a subsequent drop in emotional valence which returns then to the average
level of the whole sample. The disagreement between the self-reports and Fac-
ereader may be due to a number of factors. One interpretation of this pattern is
that Facerreader data are unreliable measures of emotional state. However, this
claim is belied by a number of studies that have documented intuitive relationships
between Facereader data and economic decisions (Nguyen and Noussair, 2014; Bre-
aban and Noussair, 2013; Van Leeuwen et al., 2014), as well as the studies cited in
section 2.3 that have validated Facereader as a tool to read emotions.
Another possibility is that the self-report data include responses from individ-
uals who feel compelled to make donations against their wishes. DellaVigna et al.
(2012) note that some individuals try to avoid donating when they can, suggesting
that confronting a decision about giving is an unpleasant experience. Indeed, we
do observe higher donations in sessions where fewer subjects are present, perhaps
16
because individuals felt more pressure to give in small sessions.
Alternatively, the discrepancy may reflect the fact that facereading captures
an immediate snapshot of current emotional state that puts much weight on the
money that one has just expended or the social pressure present at the moment,
while the self-reports reflect a more comprehensive sense of well-being, reflecting
future expectation of positive emotion and other dimensions of satisfaction not
necessarily manifest in immediate positive emotion.
A Experimental Instructions
This section contains the instructions used at the experiment. The paragraph writ-
ten in italics was added for the three informed conditions.
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. You will be asked to
split 5 Euros (in 25 cent increments) between yourself and a charitable organiza-
tion. Your earnings depend only on the decision you yourself make and will be kept
private from other participants.
The charitable organization that will receive any money you and other students
decide to donate is KNGF Geleidehonden (The Royal Dutch Guide Dog Foun-
dation), which trains guide dogs for visually-impaired people. If you prefer, we
can donate it to another charitable organization. Please indicate which one here:
.........................................
You will now be presented with a screen similar to the following one. You can only
select one option.
Please note that one of the options may be randomly pre-selected for you. A
number of published studies have shown that many people will be influenced by this
17
selection: i.e. they will donate more if the pre-selected choice offers a high dona-
tion, and they will donate less if the pre-selected choice offers a low donation.
You will be paid within two working days via a bank transfer.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask now.
Note: You will be video-taped throughout the experiment.
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